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BANK CHECKS-ACCEPTANCE-CONSTRUCTIVE-DISCHARGE OF
DRAWER-Roberts us. School District No. I of Kit Carson County,
Colorado---No. 13695-Decided December 21, 1936-Opinion
by Mr. Justice Holland.
Roberts brought suit against the school district, the county com-
missioners, Boggs as county treasurer, and Rose, his successor, and
Stockgrowers State Bank and McFerson as bank commissioner to recover
on a check issued by Boggs as county treasurer in payment of certain
warrants of the school district held by Roberts. Roberts deposited the
check in a Colorado Springs bank and in turn the check went through
several banks for collection purposes, consuming a number of successive
days and was lost in transit, whereupon on September 26 payment was
stopped and the county treasurer issued a duplicate check which took
the same course through the various banks and reached the Stockgrowers
Bank at Burlington, Colo., on October 1 in the morning and this bank
remained open all that day and until noon on October 2, when its doors
were closed and possession taken by the bank commissioner. The check
was retained by the bank and bank commissioner for more than 24 hours
before it was returned and payment refused. The county treasurer had
on deposit in the bank on the day the check arrived sufficient funds to
take up the check. Judgment was rendered below against the Stock-
growers bank and the bank commissioner but dismissed as against the
other defendants, including the school district. Proceedings in error
to review the judgment against the bank and bank commissioner was
dismissed by the Supreme Court and the plaintiff is now prosecuting
error to review the dismissal of his action against Boggs, the county
treasurer.
1. The recovery of judgment by the plaintiff against the bank
and the bank commissioner was upon the theory of constructive accept-
ance of plaintiff's check by the bank.
2. Boggs, the county treasurer, as drawer of the check, was, dis-
charged from his liability thereon by such acceptance.
3. The judgment obtained by the plaintiff against the bank and
the bank commissioner, the full benefits of which he may now enjoy,
precludes him from proceeding against the county treasurer.
4. The plaintiff procured the constructive acceptance of the check
by the bank. Plaintiff therefore cannot pursue a further remedy against
Boggs, the drawer, in the same matter upon which there is a positive
statutory discharge as under Sec. 4005, C. L. 1921, where the holder of a
check procures it to be accepted or certified, the drawer and all endorsers
are discharged from liability thereon.--Judgment affirmed.




CONTRACT-REFORMATION OF CONTRACT-WHEN NOT REFORMED
-Muchow et al. vs. Central City Gold Mines Company-No.
14079-Decided February 1, 1937--Opinion by Mr. Justice Hol-
land.
Defendant in error was plaintiff below. Plaintiff sought reforma-
tion of a contract to deposit tailings on defendant's land.
1. In order that equity may grant reformation of a contract there
must exist mutuality in the mistake.
2. Where plaintiff had opportunity, before entering into a con-
tract, to acquaint itself with information and failed to acquire same, it
cannot complain that it entered into a contract with lack of knowledge.
3. Where plaintiff entered into a contract with defendant to de-
posit tailings from its mill upon land not then owned by the defendant
but which defendant was in process of acquiring from a railroad com-
pany and plaintiff had the opportunity of ascertaining exactly what this
land was, it is estopped from claiming mistake where plaintiff failed to
avail itself of such accessible information, when it later developed that
the land it expected it was getting the right to deposit tailings upon was
not in accordance with its expectations.
4. The contract between the defendant and the railroad company
being duly recorded, plaintiff had this source of information available,
which it failed to exercise.
5. Where plaintiff partially performs, it should not expect a
court of equity to reform a contract it had already recognized and partly
performed, because plaintiff discovered later that the contract was not
profitable.
6. The contract gave plaintiff what it wanted, that is, the right
to deposit tailings on the land involved. The defendant made no mis-
representations as to the location or extent of the land and under such
circumstances, equity will leave the parties where it found them.
7. The court below erred in decreeing reformation of the con-
tract.---udgment reversed.
LIMITATIONS-STATUTE OF-PAYMENTS-EFFECT OF--AGENCY-
Dodge vs. East-No. 13846-Decided February 1, 1937--Opin-
ion by Mr. Justice Knous.
1. Where an agent is allowed to collect for principal with author-
ity to credit collections on an open account owing to agent by principal,
such collection, within the six years period of limitations, tolls the
statute.
2. Such application of collection has the same effect as voluntary
payments made by debtor.
3. Absence from the state, under Sec. 6417, C. L. 1921, tolls
the statute of limitations.-Judgment affirmed.
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FRAUD-PLEADING-DEMURRER-APPLICATION OF STATUTE OF
LIMITATIONS TO FRAUD--The First Mortgage Securities Company
et at. vs. Fader-No. 13825-Decided January 25, 1937--Opin-
ion by Mr. Justice Holland.
Action to quiet title was brought by Fader in the district court of
Yuma county, Colorado, and a judgment and decree entered in his favor.
The Platte Valley Loan and Investment Company, a corporation, prior
to 1926, was indebted to the United States National Bank of Denver in
the sum of approximately $100,000, which indebtedness was guaran-
teed by Ferguson and others, and while so indebted Ferguson, guarantor,
conveyed all his real estate in Yuma county to a firm of which he was
a member, which firm conveyed the same property to Fader, who was an
employee of the company. The United States National Bank trans-
ferred its indebtedness to the First Mortgage Securities Company, which
brought suit in the Denver district court against the maker and endorser
and attached land in Yuma county which had been conveyed to Fader.
Fader was not a party to this action. Judgment was had and attachment
sustained, execution issued and the land was sold by the sheriff and
bought in by the plaintiff in that action. Thereafter, Fader, brought
this action to quiet his title. The answer in this action set up, among
other things, that the conveyance to Fader was made to defraud the
creditors. Fader demurred and particularly demurred to the counter-
claim on the ground that it was barred by the three year and five year
statute of limitations. Demurrer sustained. Judgment on the pleadings
in favor of Fader was entered quieting his title.
1. The court obtained jurisdiction in the prior attachment action
and its judgment therein carries every presumption of regularity.
2. Even though Fader was not a party to that action it does not
avail him where the land attached was fraudulently conveyed to him to
hinder and delay or defraud the attaching creditor.
3. Where fraud tainted the conveyance then so far as a judgment
creditor is concerned the property remains subject to attachment as much
as though the fraudulent deed had never been executed.
4. If the allegations of defendants' answer and counterclaim are
true, then the conveyances from Ferguson and finally to Fader are void
as to creditors.
5. This would be true even if the conveyance to Fader was a vol-
untary one without knowledge on his part of the intent of the grantor.
6. However, the answer alleges that he did have knowledge and
participated in the furtherance of the scheme of his grantor to defraud.
7. The statute of limitations did not apply in this case. The trial
court erroneously sustained the demurrers to the answer and counterclaim
and the motion to strike.-Judgment reversed.
178 DICTA
FIRE INSURANCE-ATTEMPT TO CANCEL-NECESSITY OF FIVE DAYS'
NOTICE OF CANCELLATION TO INSURED--FAILURE TO GIVE No-
TICE-Loss-Royal Exchange Assurance of London vs. Luttrell-
No. 13759-Decided December 22, 1936-Opinion by Mr. Jus-
tice Butler.
Luttrell and another sued Royal Exchange Assurance of London
on a policy of fire insurance and recovered judgment below. The policy
was written and delivered December 6. On the following March 2 the
insurance carrier, through its agent, wrote to the insured that the Royal
Exchange did not wish to further continue the policy in force and
requested insured to return the policy for cancellation and at the same
time enclosed to insured another policy in another company to take the
place of the policy cancellation of which was sought. This letter did
not reach the insured until subsequent to a fire loss. Insured refused to
return the policy but retained the policy issued in lieu thereof.
1. The policy contained a clause that it could be cancelled by the
insurance company at any time by giving notice to the insured a notice
of cancellation in writing at least five days before cancellation would be
effective.
2. Such notice was not given in this case five days before t;he loss.
3. The policy was in full force and effect at the time the loss
occurred.
4. There was no evidence that assured either consented to can-
cellation before loss occurred or waived the notice of such cancellation
provided for in the policy.
5. There was no ratification upon the part of the insured of the.
act of the agent in the attempted cancellation.-Judgment affirmed.
Mr. Justice Hilliard, Mr. Justice Bouck and Mr. Justice Holland
dissent.
MALICIOUS PROSECUTION - INSUFFICIENCY OF COMPLAINT
DISMISSAL FOR INSUFFICIENCY-WAIVING RULE WHERE
CAUSE IS PROSECUTED BY LAYMAN INSTEAD OF A LAWYER-
SPECIAL APPEARANCE-Viles vs. Symes et al.-No. 13807-
Decided January 25, 1937-Opinion by Mr. Justice Young.
Viles, plaintiff, brought an action for malicious prosecution against
the defendants. The plaintiff was a layman who prosecuted the case
without legal counsel. Two of the defendants, L. B. Johnson and
Percy A. Robinson, were dismissed under special appearances, the first
being sustained on the ground that it was a personal action and as to
Johnson, service was made in California where he was a resident. Spe-
cial appearance of Robinson was sustained on the ground that he was
later included as a defendant in an amended complaint without leave of
court first obtained. As to the comPlaint, the court sustained a motion
to make it more specific and an amended complaint was filed and to the
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amended complaint a motion was filed to make it more specific, which
was sustained and the plaintiff filed a bill of particulars which on motion
was stricken because insufficient and judgment of dismissal was entered.
The plaintiff then orally moved for leave to file another amended com-
plaint, which was denied.
1. In view of the fact that the plaintiff is a layman and appeared
without counsel, we apply Rule 35 of this court providing that the court
may in its discretion notice any error appearing of record but not properly
assigned.
2. In the exercise of a sound discretion the court below should
have given the plaintiff leave to again attempt to file a further amended
complaint as to matters clearly within the plaintiff's knowledge.
3. In making such ruling it is not determined whether the com-
plaint states a cause of action or whether a cause of action can be started.
4. The ruling of the court dismissing the defendants, Johnson
and Robinson, was correct.
The judgment, insofar as it quashed the service of summons as to
defendants, L. B. Johnson and Percy A. Robinson, is affirmed. In all
other respects it is reversed and the cause remanded for further proceed-
ings.-Mr. Justice Bouch dissents. Mr. Justice Bakke and Mr. Justice
Knous not participating. Mr. Justice Bouck files dissenting opinion.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-CAUSE OF DEATH-NECESSITY OF
CAUSE BEING ACCIDENTAL-HEART DISEASE OR OVEREXER-
TION-The Industrial Commission et at. vs. Wetz et al.-No.
14057-Decided January 11, 1937--Opinion by Mr. Justice Hot-
land.
The Commission denied any award to compensation to the widow
of Wetz on the ground that his death was not the result of accidental
injury, but was due to heart failure. The District Court reversed this.
1. The burden is upon a claimant to show by sufficient substan-
tial evidence that the death was caused by an accident arising out of and
in the course of the employment and that it had a direct causal connection
therewith and that it must be traceable to a definite source.
2. The matter of "overexertion" is the only question here pre-
sented for solution. There is no testimony to the effect that deceased
overexerted himself in any way. The necessary link connecting heart
failure with the employment is not established by the evidence.
3. To make its finding setting aside the award of the Commission,
the District Court must have based it upon inferences drawn from the
evidence, in violation of the rule that such inferences and conclusions are
solely for the Commission and not for the courts.
4. The question of whether the deceased died of heart failure or
from overexertion while repairing a tractor was a controverted question
before the Commission, thus leaving the question one of fact for the
Commission and not one of law for the court.-Judgment reversed.
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REPLEVIN-CHATrEL MORTGAGE-DURESS--QUESTION FOR JURY
-Walker vs. Dearing et al.-No. 13867-Decided January 25,
1937-Opinion by Mr. Justice Holland.
This is a replevin action brought by Walker to obtain possession of
personal property covered by delinquent chattel mortgage. The plaintiff
was successful in justice court and on appeal to the county court jury
brought in a verdict for the defendants. Walker represented one E. R.
Powell, who obtained a judgment in justice court. Walker had himself
appointed special constable and proceeded to make a levy on defendants'
household furniture and represented to them that he had acquired a
mortgage against the furniture and unless they gave him additionhal secur-
ity he would take their furniture under the levy. Walker had already
levied upon an automobile under the judgment. Under these circum-
stances the Dearings gave a second mortgage to Walker and in considera-
tion Walker satisfied the judgment and released the automobile. De-
fendants failed to pay the mortgage and replevin action was brought by
Walker and redelivery bond given by defendants.
1. There was not sufficient evidence to submit to the jury the
question of duress.
2. While the methods of Walker in obtaining the second mort-
gage might be looked upon with disfavor, yet he was only pursuing a
right that the law gave him and the evidence is not sufficiently convincing
to support the alleged duress.
3. While the position of the Dearings was an embarrassing one
and Walker took advantage of the situation, all the circumstances of the
case finally operated for the present relief of the debtors. Under these
circumstances, the claim of defendants that the second chattel mortgage
was without consideration is without foundation.
4. The verdict was contrary to law.-Judgment reversed.
MONEY LENDERS ACT OF 1913-LOANS--CHARGING INTEREST IN
EXCESS OF LAWFUL RATE-EFFECT-Waddell vs. Traylor-
No. 13979-Decded January 25, 1937--Opinion by Mr. Justice
)foung.
Traylor recovered a judgment below for an unpaid balance of prom-
issory note. Defend-ant's first defense was payment of more than suffi-
cient to satisfy the note providing they were only charged lawful inter-
est. Second defense was that part of the principal expressed in the note
was in truth and fact unlawful interest and included in the face of the
note. Third defense was that Traylor as a money lender failed to comply
with chapter 108 of the 1913 Session Laws. Fourth defense was that the
interest charges were unconscionable and oppressive. The court sus-
tained general demurrer to the second, third and fourth defenses.
1. The Money Lenders Act of 1913 above referred to is constitu-
tional for the title is sufficiently broad to cover the act.
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2. The exceptions made in the act are reasonable.
3. The provisions of the act that treble the interest paid, if in
excess of twelve per cent, may be recovered and that a violation of the
act shall be a misdemeanor is a declaration of public policy. A contract
for payment of interest of more than twelve per cent shall not be enforce-
able as to such excess.
4. To permit the plaintiff to recover the interest claimed would
allow a consideration for the use of the money received greatly in excess
of rate fixed by the 1913 act.
5. Courts will not lend their aid to the enforcement of terms of
a contract which will result in the consummation of a criminal act, or
one contrary to the public policy of the state.
6. Even where unlawful interest is charged a recovery can be had
for the amount of the money actually loaned, together with such con-
sideration for its use as might lawfully have been contracted for under
the act, because the act does not make the note void by reason of excessive
charge of interest but specifies the penalty for charging excessive interest.
--Judgment reversed and remanded for further proceedings.
ELECTIONS-PETITION FOR RESTRAINING ORDER AGAINST ELEC-
TION OFFICIALS AND OTHERS--SUFFICIENCY OF-The People
of the State of Colorado on the Relation of Raymond L. Sauter
et al. vs. Monson et al.-No. 14055-Decided October 28, 1936
-- Opinion by Mr. Justice Hilliard.
Original action for restraining order against respondents for inter-
fering in any way with a free, fair and open election, from threatening
to discharge or to reward any employees of the City and County of
Denver for giving or withholding his support in favor of or against any
candidate and for appointment of watchers in polling places in Denver
and in two precincts in Grand county.
1. The petition fails to state a cause of action.
2. The petitioners have failed to charge facts sufficient to bring
them under the rule announced in People ex rel. Attorney General vs.
Tool, 35 Colo. 225, 86 Pac. 224.
3. Where there is no charge of fraud, wrongdoing, conspiracy or
confederation against the election commission or any of the election
judges, the petition states no cause of action.
4. As to Grand county, the petition fails to show that the ordi-
nary processes of the law are not sufficient to detect and defeat fraudu-
lent registrations if they exist.-Petition dismissed.
Mr. Justice Bouck, Mr. Justice Holland and Mr. Justice Young
concur.
Mr. Chief Justice Campbell and Mr. Justice Butler not participat-
ing.
Mr. Justice Burke dissents.
182 DICTA
PUBLIC UTILITIES-POWER OF STATE UNIVERSITY TO OPERATE
BUSSES FOR STUDENTS-Burnside et at. vs. Regents of the Uni-
versity of Colorado-No. 13842-Decided February 1, 1937-
Opinion by Mr. Justice Bakke.
Plaintiffs in error, plaintiffs below, sought to enjoin the regents
of the University of Colorado from operating certain motor busses for
the use of students during the summer school on the ground that they
had not complied with the Public Utilities Commission of Colorado
laws. Judgment denying injunction.
1. The university was operating these busses during the summer
school session exclusively for the use of its students under special author-
ity from the P. U. C. authorizing it so to do and the P. U. C. had the
right to make such exception as long as only university students were
served by the busses and the general public was not transported.
2. It further appears that the university carries public liability
insurance on the busses it operates and further that the busses while
operating in the Rocky Mountain National Park are specifically exempted
by the Department of the Interior from their rules and regulations gov-
erning commerical vehicles.
3. Under the Constitution, the university, through its board of
regents, has the exclusive control and direction of all funds of and appro-
priations to the university and such board having determined that the
operation of the busses were a necessary incident to the operation of the
university it does not lie with the court to interfere with their discretion
in deciding what methods they adopt to accomplish what they deem
necessary for the university and it is not for the court to substitute its
opinion as to the necessity thereof.
4. The university was within its legal rights in so operating the
busses.-Judgment affirmed.
INSURANCE-LIFE--SERVICE OF SUMMONS-WHAT CONSTITUTES
DOING BUSINESS WITHIN THE STATE-WHAT CONSTITUTES AN
AGENT-Union Mutual Life Company of Iowa vs. Bailey-No.
13872-Decided January 25, 1937--Opinion by Mr. Justice Hol-
land.
Bailey, the beneficiary in life insurance policy on his wife, recovered
below after the death of his wife. The insurance company was an Iowa
company, had not complied with the laws of Colorado, but solicited the
application of the deceased by broadcasting over the radio. The applica-
tion was mailed from Denver, received in Iowa and the policy issued in
Iowa. After the death of insured the insurance company sent an agexnt
to Denver with power to adjust or reject the claim and this suit was
started and service procured on this agent. The court below held that
the service was good and that the company was doing business in Colo-
rado and therefore subject to the Colorado law.
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1. Service of summons may be upon any agent of a foreign cor-
poration doing business in this state.
2. When a foreign corporation invests its agent with broad pow-
ers to settle, adjust or reject its claims, service upon such an agent is
proper.
3. Foreign insurance company which solicits business in Colorado
over the radio and receives applications for insurance resulting from such
solicitation upon which it delivers policies in Colorado, is doing business
in Colorado and is subject to the Colorado insurance laws.
4. Under such circumstances, the Colorado law provides that the
policy shall constitute the entire contract and is incontestable after having
been in force two years from its date and it was unlawful for the insur-
ance company to deliver a policy in Colorado without incorporating such
provision.-Judgment affirmed.
UNLAWFUL DETENTION-REDEMPTION OTHERWISE THAN BY STAT-
UTE-LIS PENDENS--Scott Vs. Weimer-No. 13998-Decided
October 5, 1936--Opinion by Mr. Justice Hilliard.
This was an unlawful detention suit. Judgment below for plain-
tiff. Plaintiff has foreclosed a deed of trust and at sale became the pur-
chaser. Certificate of purchase was issued and after period of redemp-
tion, received trustee's deed and then brought the action for unlawful
detainer.
1. It is no defense that subsequent to foreclosure that defendant
could have procured a Home Owners' Loan payable in bonds for the
full amount of the judgment and costs. The status of debtor and
creditor had closed. To effect redemption, defendant was required to
make payment to the public trustee. Plaintiff was not obliged to accept
the offer.
2. Plaintiff is not required to file a notice of lis pendens so far as
defendant is concerned.--Judgment affirmed.
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